
Finishing up U.T. Place's "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" (1956) and starting on J.J.C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959). Place argues against the "phenomenological fallacy," i.e. the reality of the contents of one's inner life. Then Smart considers objects against mind/brain identity: Must qualities of sensations be something over and above qualities of brain processes? Finally, is mind/brain identity a scientific hypothesis at all? Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com. Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons of bonus discussion.
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PEL Presents NEM#261: Joan as Policewoman's Living Growth

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Ep. 401: Mind/Brain Identity Theory (U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart) (Part One)

PREMIUM-Ep. 400: Dennett Rejects Qualia (Part Three)
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