ECP Buys TPI Blade Factories, GE Vernova Secures Blades

Allen covers how private equity firm Energy Capital Partners ended up owning wind blade factories, TPI Composites’ bankruptcy, and the decades-long GE Vernova relationship behind the rescue. Sign up now for Uptime Tech News, our weekly newsletter on all things wind technology. This episode is sponsored by Weather Guard Lightning Tech. Learn more about Weather Guard’s StrikeTape Wind Turbine LPS retrofit. Follow the show on YouTube, Linkedin and visit Weather Guard on the web. And subscribe to Rosemary’s “Engineering with Rosie” YouTube channel here. Have a question we can answer on the show? Email us! Speaker: Happy Monday, everyone. Well, there is a company most people have never heard of quietly positioning itself at the very center of America’s energy future. Its name is Energy Capital Partners. It’s a private equity firm headquartered up in Summit, New Jersey. But to understand how ECP ended up owning wind blade factories, you have to start with gas turbines and a power company called Calpine. See, back in 2001, Calpine placed one of the most audacious turbine orders ever recorded, 203 GE gas turbines. enough to power 50,000 megawatts of base load generation. GE did [00:01:00] not just sell Calpine turbines. The two companies co-developed power plants together. GE co-owned facilities. Calpine held options to buy them back. It was a less a vendor relationship and more of a marriage. In 2018, Energy Capital Partners bought Calpine, All 77 power plants, 26,000 megawatts of generation capacity, and every long-term GE service agreement that came with it. And for the next seven years, ECP was GE’s single most consequential private sector gas turbine customer in the Western Hemisphere. That relationship, built on decades of iron and service contracts, would soon reach far beyond gas. Because on the other side of the energy world, a very different kind of company was falling apart, and that was TPI Composites. For years, the world’s largest independent maker of wind turbine blades. [00:02:00] facilities in Iowa, in Mexico, in India, and in Turkey. More than 9,600 employees worldwide. But the cracks were forming long before anyone said bankruptcy. First came the debt. TPI had borrowed heavily from Oaktree Capital Management and by the time the end arrived, the company owed Oaktree $476 million, secured against substantially all of its assets. Then came the customers. Nordex walked away from its Matamoros facility, shutting it down at the end of the second quarter of 2024. Then came customs. US Customs and Border Protection launched a review of TPI’s Mexico facilities under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. TPI maintained its supply chain had no connection to forced labor, but the law did not care about confidence. Cared about proof, and while TPI worked to prove its innocence, a substantial portion of its Mexico-made blades could not cross the border into [00:03:00] the United States. The backlog told the story in numbers. At the end of 2024, there were $237 million in orders. One year later, $114 million in orders, cut nearly in half. On August 11th of last year, TPI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, delisted from NASDAQ about eight days later. Now, when a company heads into bankruptcy, the first thing it has to solve is a very human problem. How do you keep the people who know how to run the place from walking out the door? Well, TPI’s board had an answer. Two months before the bankruptcy filing, the compensation committee approved retention bonuses for key executives, paid in cash within 30 days. The CEO, $1,225,000. The CFO, $518,000. The COO, [00:04:00] $487,000. And of course, the general counsel, $435,000. But there was one condition, you had to stay through restructuring. If you left early, you had to give it all back. Well, they stayed, at least most of them