Chullin 36 - June 5, 20 Sivan

A braita states that if blood spurts onto a gourd during slaughter, Rebbi holds it is susceptible to impurity, while Rabbi Chiya holds we suspend judgment (tolin). Rabbi Oshaya says that since they argue, we should rely on Rabbi Shimon's view that shechita makes an animal susceptible, not blood. Two different explanations are brought by Rav Papa and Rav Ashi to explain Rabbi Chiya's position, the point on which he disagrees with Rebbi, and how Rabbi Shimon's view helps determine that the halakha follows Rabbi Chiya. Rav Papa explains that both Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya agree that blood makes items susceptible if it remains from the beginning to the end of the slaughter, and they only argue if the blood was wiped away between cutting the two simanim. Rebbi holds slaughter is continuous from beginning to end, so it is considered slaughter blood. Rabbi Chiya holds slaughter only occurs at the very end, so the earlier blood is just wound blood, and tolin means we wait to see if blood remains at the end of the slaughter. Rav Ashi argues that for Rabbi Chiya, it is a doubt whether or not slaughter is continuous, so tolin means we neither eat it nor burn it. Both explanations show that Rabbi Oshaya aligned Rabbi Chiya with Rabbi Shimon to make Rebbi a minority opinion of one against two; even though he did not agree with Rabbi Chiya in theory, in practice, they hold the same position. Reish Lakish asks whether the endearment of sacred items (chibat hakodesh) allows the dry crumbs of a meal offering to pass on impurity to other items, or if it only functions to disqualify the item itself. Rabbi Eleazar attempts to prove from a verse that water is always required for susceptibility to pass on impurity to other items, and therefore it is clear that chibat hakodesh would not be able to pass on impurity, but the Gemara rejects his suggestion as it is inconclusive. Rav Yosef challenges Rabbi Elazar's position from Rabbi Shimon's statement that shechita makes an animal susceptible to impurity even to pass on impurity, and Rabbi Zeira brings a similar challenge from a different case. Abaye resolves both challenges by explaining that in those particular cases, the rabbis rabbinically treated them like a regular susceptibility by water, but by Torah law they are not susceptible to impurity at all. The Gemara then proves that chibat hakodesh operates on a Torah level, and therefore Reish Lakish's question is still in place. What is the source in the Torah for chibat hakodesh being a Torah law? The first attempted answer is rejected, but they bring a second answer, which is accepted. Reish Lakish's question regarding whether it can pass on impurity remains unresolved (teiku).