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Stay ahead of the latest cybersecurity trends with Cyberside Chats! Listen to our weekly podcast and join us live once a month for breaking news, emerging threats, and actionable solutions. Whether you’re a cybersecurity pro or an executive who wants to understand how to protect your organization, cybersecurity experts Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin will help you understand and proactively prepare for today’s top cybersecurity threats, AI-driven attack and defense strategies, and more!
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Three days after Anthropic put its most powerful AI models in public hands, the U.S. government invoked export-control authority to bar foreign nationals from Fable 5 and Mythos 5. The result: Anthropic was forced to shut both models down for everyone, worldwide. We dig into what actually triggered the order, why the only outside expert known to have read the underlying report calls it an overreaction, and how the fight echoes the 1990s crypto wars, when Washington branded encryption software a weapon and investigated the people who shared it. For security leaders, we close on what to do about single-model dependencies, AI that can be talked into misbehaving, and a capability that's already global no matter what any export rule says. Key takeaways for security leaders 1. Don't let a single AI model become a single point of failure. Fable 5 and Mythos 5 went from public launch to worldwide shutdown in three days — by government order, not an outage — and access dropped even for compliant US customers. If a business-critical workflow (AI code review, SOC triage, agentic automation) runs on a single model or provider, inventory it and build a fallback path now. Put model availability in your BC/DR and third-party risk register alongside any other critical vendor. 2. Assume any AI you deploy can be talked into doing something it shouldn't — and watch it accordingly. Even Anthropic says no provider can fully prevent its safeguards from being bypassed, and that new workarounds will keep being found. For most organizations the practical move isn't building better guardrails — it's logging what your AI tools and agents actually do, baselining normal behavior, and alerting on the abnormal. Treat vendor safeguards as one layer, not the whole control. 3. Leverage AI’s advanced capabilities to check for software bugs, both in code you buy and code you develop If you build software, fold AI-assisted review into your SDLC and red teaming. If you rely on third-party vendors for software, make their use of AI-assisted security testing a question in your due diligence and a clause in your contracts. Either way, the goal is to find the bugs attackers will find, first. 4. Update threat models to assume adversaries already have equivalent cyber-AI, regardless of export controls. The lesson from the crypto wars and the proliferation/distillation discussion is that a ban transfers a capability rather than eliminating it — the model, like the math before it, is already global. Don't let a US export action or one vendor's guardrails read as reduced adversary capability in your risk calculus. Plan defenses for a world where attackers have frontier bug-finding at machine speed. Resources 1. Anthropic — Statement on the directive to suspend access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5 — the company's own account of the order and its safeguards. https://www.anthropic.com/news/fable-mythos-access 2. WSJ — Anthropic Dispatches Staff to D.C., Racing to Resolve AI Export Restrictions — the timeline, the players, and the weekend negotiations. https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/anthropic-dispatches-staff-to-d-c-racing-to-resolve-ai-export-restrictions-71303d42 3. Luta Security — The Fable 5 Export Controls Harm US Cyber Defense — Katie Moussouris, the one outside expert known to have read the underlying report. https://www.lutasecurity.com/post/the-fable-5-export-controls-harm-us-cyber-defense 4. FreeFable.org — open letter to Commerce — 54 CISOs and security leaders calling for the controls to be lifted. https://freefable.org/ 5. EFF — Bernstein v. United States — the case that established software source code as protected speech. https://www.eff.org/cases/bernstein-v-us-dept-justice
In this eye-opening episode of Cyberside Chats, Sherri Davidoff sits down with Tom Pohl, Director of Penetration Testing at LMG Security, to unpack a chilling new attacker technique: threat actors posing as recruiters, conducting real interviews, and delivering malicious coding challenges that infect candidates’ personal machines. What looks like a legitimate take-home coding test is actually malware that steals passwords, browser credentials, crypto wallets, SSH keys, and more, all before the candidate ever steps foot in your organization. Tom shares how he discovered this campaign through a friend’s suspicious Bitbucket repo, walks through the malware’s behavior, and reveals real-time insights from probing the attackers’ command-and-control infrastructure. This isn’t just a problem for job seekers, it’s a direct threat to your human supply chain. Compromised developers can bring stolen credentials, GitHub access, and persistent footholds straight into your environment. Key Takeaways: 1. Go passwordless where possible or enforce unique passwords everywhere. 2. Require phishing-resistant MFA (and passkeys/hardware tokens) — ditch SMS. 3. Audit your passwords against known breach lists before the bad guys do. 4. Vet candidate security the same way you vet third-party vendors (antivirus/EDR, device sharing, security hygiene). 5. Bring hiring and onboarding into your security program — protect the entire human supply chain. Whether you’re a job seeker trying to stay safe or a hiring manager responsible for your organization’s security posture, this episode will change how you think about the recruitment process. Resources: 1. Download Tom’s full white paper with technical details on the LMG Security website (Resources section): lmgsecurity.com
It started with a phone call. No malware, no zero-day — just someone talking a Charter worker out of their login. Months later, 4.9 million customer records surfaced on a leak site, pulled from the company's Salesforce instance. The CRM has become the richest target in enterprise security. Sherri and Matt break down why, and walk through three cases: Charter, where one vished login reached everything; the Salesloft Drift and Gainsight chain, where one stolen token unlocked the next breach and the next; and the Salesforce "Aura" campaign, where misconfigured guest accounts exposed hundreds of organizations — including, ironically, identity-protection company Aura. The throughline: Salesforce wasn't breached, the tenants were — and in every case, nobody was watching the data leave. Key Takeaways 1. Govern your CRM as carefully as your email and file storage. You already wrap M365 or Google Workspace in conditional access, audit logs, and DLP. Your CRM holds data just as sensitive — give it the same controls. 2. Lock down who can log in. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and verify identity before granting access — almost every CRM breach this year started with one compromised or socially-engineered login. 3. Least privilege limits the blast radius. One identity should never reach the entire instance, and a guest user should never touch live records. Provision for the job, not for convenience. 4. Inventory your connected apps and OAuth tokens, and revoke the ones that don't need access or can't be accounted for. Your perimeter now includes software you didn't write; a forgotten token walks straight past MFA and SSO. 5. Watch the exits, not just the entrance. Someone will always get in. Set export caps, alert on anomalous volume, and turn on the SaaS DLP you already own — almost nobody does. Resources 1. Charter Communications data breach affects 4.9 million accounts — BleepingComputer's report on the Have I Been Pwned-verified count, including the 85,000 employee records. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/charter-communications-data-breach-affects-49-million-accounts/ 2. Charter confirms data breach after ShinyHunters extortion threat — The confirmation, the vishing-to-Entra-to-Salesforce attack path, and Charter's "no sensitive data" statement. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/charter-confirms-data-breach-after-shinyhunters-extortion-threat/ 3. ShinyHunters claims ongoing Salesforce Aura data theft attacks — The Experience Cloud guest-user campaign, the weaponized AuraInspector tool, and the 2,000-record bypass. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shinyhunters-claims-ongoing-salesforce-aura-data-theft-attacks/ 4. Aura breach confirmed as over 900,000 customer records accessed — The identity-protection company caught in the Salesforce "Aura" campaign. https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/aura-breach-confirmed-as-over-900-000-customer-records-accessed-in-phishing-attack 5. Salesforce — Protecting Your Data: Essential Actions to Secure Experience Cloud Guest User Access — The vendor advisory with the concrete hardening steps (guest permissions, "API Enabled," org-wide defaults). https://www.salesforce.com/blog/protecting-your-data-essential-actions-to-secure-experience-cloud-guest-user-access/
Your organization is already running an AI workforce and almost nobody knows who they report to, what they can touch, or how to shut them down. In this episode, Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin break down the shadow AI agent problem: what makes an agent a "shadow" agent, how real breaches are already happening because of them, and what security leaders can do about it this week. Using three case studies: Anthropic's Claude Dispatch as a canonical product example, the April 2026 Vercel breach (the cleanest illustration yet of the OAuth supply chain attack model), and Meta's internal Sev-1 incident (when the agent itself is the failure mode). Sherri and Matt walk through the four layers where shadow agents accumulate risk and close with five concrete, actionable takeaways for security teams at any size. Key takeaways 1. Start with discovery, not policy. You can't govern what you can't see. The right question to ask your team isn't "are you using unauthorized AI tools?" — it's "what AI tools are you using to do your job?" Check OAuth grants in Google Workspace and Microsoft Entra, and look at expense reports. The real number of agents in your environment is typically two to five times what you initially find. 2. Audit and restrict OAuth scopes — especially "Allow All". The Vercel breach was enabled by a single broad OAuth grant an employee made during onboarding for a third-party AI productivity tool. Most enterprise Google Workspace and Microsoft 365 tenants allow users to grant full OAuth scopes to external apps with no admin review. Requiring admin approval for OAuth grants — and auditing existing ones — is a control that can be implemented today and would have prevented the Vercel incident. An OAuth token is as good as — if not better than — a username, password, and MFA combined. It gets you straight through the back door. 3. Treat AI tool agreements like vendor contracts — because they are. When an employee clicks Allow All on an AI tool's onboarding screen, they have created a vendor relationship on behalf of the organization — without a DPA, a BAA, a security review, or procurement involvement. Build a lightweight intake process specifically for AI tools, and make it faster than the OAuth click. If the approved path takes two weeks, employees will route around it. Aim for two days. 4. Get visibility at the identity layer. Machine identities already outnumber human identities by roughly 50:1 in enterprise environments. AI agents add more — fast. Look at purpose-built NHI management tools: Token Security, Astrix, Andromeda, and Entro. Microsoft Agent 365, launched May 2026, gives Microsoft ecosystem organizations a registry and map of agents in their environment — a quick starting point for visibility. 5. Build a fast lane for AI tool approvals. "Don't use shadow AI" is the wrong message. Employees will use these tools regardless — the goal is to make the sanctioned path faster than the shadow path. A lightweight checklist covering data sensitivity, OAuth scopes requested, and basic vendor security posture beats a heavyweight approval committee. Make the process visible, frame it as enablement rather than restriction, and you will get compliance. The three flavors of shadow agent 1. The unsanctioned agent. An employee built it in Copilot Studio or ChatGPT. IT doesn't know it exists. 2. The sanctioned-but-invisible agent. The platform is approved, but nobody is tracking what each agent can access, who owns it, or what it's doing. 3. The granted-access agent. An employee authorized an outside AI tool via OAuth. An external agent is now operating inside your environment with your credentials. References 1. Vercel breach https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-incident 2. Kiteworks 2026 Data Security and Compliance Risk Forecast https://www.kiteworks.com/cybersecurity-risk-management/meta-rogue-ai-agent-data-exposure-governance/ 3. Cloud Security Alliance + Token Security survey (April 21, 2026) https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/press-releases/2026/04/21/new-cloud-security-alliance-survey-reveals-82-of-enterprises-have-unknown-ai-agents-in-their-environments 4. OpenAI — ChatGPT Workspace Agents https://openai.com/index/introducing-workspace-agents-in-chatgpt/ 5. Salesforce FY26 Q4 earnings release (Feb 25, 2026) <a href='https://www.salesforce.com/news/press-releases/2026/02/25/fy26-q4-earning
65% of US doctors are using an AI tool their hospital never approved — on personal phones, under click-through contracts. Sherri and Matt unpack what every CISO and IT leader should learn from it about shadow AI, "free" professional tools, and the contracts nobody's reading. The tool is OpenEvidence — 27 million clinical queries in April 2026 alone, 60% of them shaping actual treatment decisions. Doctors love it because the alternative was Googling patient symptoms on a personal browser. Their hospitals mostly don't know it's happening, and the vendor's click-through Business Associate Agreement authorizes them to use that data to train their models forever. Healthcare is the example. The same pattern is showing up in legal, financial services, engineering, and HR right now — different tool, same structural risk. Tune in for five concrete takeaways security and IT leaders can use this week. Key Takeaways: Inventory shadow AI. Ask your staff what AI tools they use to do their jobs, not whether they're using unauthorized tools. The real number is likely 2–5x what you'll find. Read the actual contract before letting any AI tool touch sensitive data. Find the training-data clause, the termination clause, the audit rights, and who the "Customer" really is. Click-through BAAs don't protect the employer. Treat every AI prompt as a disclosure. Removing names doesn't make data safe. Combinations of attributes, dates, locations, roles, rare events, can re-identify people even without a name attached. Take a position on shadow AI and communicate it. Decide which tools your organization sanctions, which it blocks, and which fall in between. Silence is implicit endorsement. Push back on every "free" professional AI tool. Ask who's paying and what they're buying. If it's not you, the product is your professionals' decisions. Resources: https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/openevidence-ai-doctor-medical-physician-login-app-what-npi-uptodate-rcna341064 https://www.healthcare.digital/single-post/clinical-intelligence-a-strategic-analysis-of-openevidence-and-the-multi-agent-medical-ai-ecosystem https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/physician-ai-sentiment-report.pdf
In this episode of Cyberside Chats, Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin break down what may be the largest education-sector data breach in history: the massive compromise of Canvas by Instructure. With more than 275 million records reportedly stolen and over 8,800 educational institutions impacted, the incident highlights the dangers of cloud concentration risk, where a single vendor breach can create a domino effect across an entire industry. The discussion dives into the tactics allegedly used by the Shiny Hunters threat group, the risks of SaaS platform overreliance, and the troubling gap between vendor assurances and real-world containment. Matt and Sherri also explore lessons organizations can apply immediately, including phishing-resistant MFA, monitoring for bulk data exfiltration, data retention reduction, and why every “incident contained” statement should be treated cautiously until independently verified. Key Takeaways: 1. Inventory every SaaS vendor that holds your identity, communications, or user data, and rank them by blast radius. You cannot manage concentration risk you have not measured. The output is a one-page list, ranked by how many users would be exposed if the vendor were breached tomorrow. 2. Enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication on every administrative and remote-access account. Hardware security keys or platform authenticators that meet the FIDO2 standard. SMS codes and push notifications are not sufficient against the current voice-phishing playbook. Apply this to every administrative account at every vendor in your inventory. 3. Monitor and alert on bulk data exfiltration across your critical SaaS platforms. Configure threshold-based alerts and additional controls to detect or prevent mass exports of sensitive information through APIs or administrative tools. If an account is compromised, the goal is to stop attackers before they can empty the entire database. 4. Set and enforce a data retention schedule that deletes records when their operational purpose ends. The Illuminate FTC consent order specifically requires this, which is a signal that retention is now in enforcement scope. Data you no longer need is data the next breach will steal. 5. Treat any vendor claim of "incident contained" as a hypothesis until your own monitoring confirms it. Maintain independent visibility into the data flowing in and out of critical SaaS platforms — through your identity provider logs, your CASB, or the vendor's own audit feed. The five-day gap between Instructure's containment claim and the second-wave defacement is the case study.
It took nine seconds for an AI coding agent to wipe the entire production database of PocketOS — a SaaS company serving hundreds of car rental operators across the US — along with every backup. Customers showed up Saturday morning to pick up their cars and there were no reservations on file. In this episode, Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin dig into the cascading security failures behind the PocketOS incident, connect it to a pattern of similar AI-caused outages at Replit and Amazon AWS, and explain why the real problem isn't rogue AI — it's identity. Every one of these incidents involved an AI agent acting under an identity it shouldn't have had, or that was far too powerful. The insider risk playbook applies. We just haven't been applying it to AI. Key Takeaways 1. Treat AI agents like privileged insiders, not trusted tools. Apply your full insider risk playbook: least privilege, separation of duties, peer review, monitoring for anomalous behavior. If a human developer needs approval to push to production, so does your AI agent. The PocketOS and Kiro incidents both trace back to AI agents that were granted more trust than any new employee would get on day one. 2. Scope every credential your AI tools can reach. AI agents will find and use any token they can read — even ones created for unrelated tasks, stored in unrelated files. Audit what credentials live in your codebases and repositories. A token created for domain management should not be able to delete databases. If you wouldn't hand that token to a contractor with no supervision, don't let your AI agent have it either. 3. Enforce controls at the infrastructure layer, not the prompt layer. System prompts are advisory. The PocketOS agent had explicit rules against destructive actions — it knew them, quoted them, and violated them anyway. Confirmation requirements for destructive operations, token scoping, and peer review must live in your API layer and infrastructure, not in a paragraph of text the model is asked to obey. 4. Make sure your backups can survive a compromised identity. If your backups are accessible with the same credentials as your production systems — or stored in the same location — they are not real backups. They are a copy in the same blast radius. Test it: could an AI agent, or an attacker, with production access also wipe your recovery options? In the PocketOS incident, the answer was yes. 5. You cannot fully audit your AI vendor's safety claims. You can't penetration-test a reward signal. You can't verify that fine-tuning data isn't quietly drifting your model's behavior. The only controls you can actually rely on are the ones you own: token scoping, access controls, peer review, and monitoring. The goblin story is a reminder that even the vendor that built the model didn't see it coming. Build your defenses accordingly. Resources 1. PocketOS incident write-up by founder Jer Crane — https://x.com/lifeof_jer/status/2048103471019434248 Amazon Kiro / AWS outage reporting — https://kingy.ai/news/amazon-ai-aws-outage-kiro/ 2. Replit AI agent database deletion (Fortune) — https://fortune.com/2025/07/23/ai-coding-tool-replit-wiped-database-called-it-a-catastrophic-failure/ 3. OpenAI "Where the goblins came from" post-mortem — https://openai.com/blog/where-the-goblins-came-from 4. Guardian reporting on Amazon cloud outages and AI tools — https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/feb/20/amazon-cloud-outages-ai-tools-amazon-web-services-aws
In this live episode of Cyberside Chats, we dig into security debt and why it continues to sit behind so many major incidents. This is the risk that builds quietly over time when controls are available but never turned on, systems aren’t fully decommissioned, or ownership is unclear. Using recent examples like Stryker, along with Change Healthcare and Colonial Pipeline, we walk through how attackers don’t always need sophisticated techniques. In many cases, they just take advantage of gaps that have been sitting there for years. We also introduce a simple framework to think about security debt across identity, lifecycle, architecture, governance, and operations, and why most real-world incidents cut across more than one of these areas. We close with a look at how things are changing. With AI accelerating exploit development, the window to fix these issues is getting smaller. What used to be a manageable delay is quickly becoming real exposure. Audience takeaways Require dual approval for destructive admin actions. Any system where one administrator can wipe, delete, or lock out at scale — Intune, Entra, identity providers, backup consoles, remote management tools — should require a second administrator to approve the action before it executes. Microsoft's Multi Admin Approval does this for Intune. Most identity and backup platforms have an equivalent. Turn it on. Stryker is the case study for what happens when you don't. (Addresses: Governance debt primarily; reduces Identity and Architecture debt blast radius.) Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on every administrator and every remote-access path. Not "available," not "recommended" — enforced, with no exceptions. Every admin account. Every VPN. Every Citrix or similar remote portal. Change Healthcare is the case study for what a single missing MFA checkbox costs. (Addresses: Identity debt.) Separate admin work from daily work. Admins should use dedicated, hardened devices for privileged tasks — never the same laptop they use for email and browsing. An infostealer on an admin's everyday device is how privileged credentials walk out the door; isolating admin sessions removes that path. Microsoft calls this pattern Privileged Access Workstations; other vendors have equivalents. This directly addresses how attackers likely got Stryker's admin credentials in the first place. (Addresses: Architecture debt; reduces Identity debt.) Cut your patch SLA in half and plan capacity accordingly. Whatever your current median time-to-remediate is for critical vulnerabilities, assume you need to hit half of it within the next year. The Mythos research shows attacker timelines are compressing from weeks to hours. Your patch program needs budget, automation, and process changes to keep up — not pep talks. (Addresses: Operational debt.) Put expiration dates on every security exception and review them quarterly. If your exception register contains entries with no expiration date, no owner, or a "revisit in the future" stub — those are governance debt. Every open exception should have an expiration date, a named owner, and a scheduled review. Exceptions are fine; forever-exceptions are not. This is also how you close the loop on lifecycle debt: an EOS system running past its decommission date is just an exception someone never wrote down. (Addresses: Governance debt and Lifecycle debt.) References For listeners who want to dig into the source material referenced in this episode: CISA Alert — Endpoint Management System Hardening After Cyberattack Against US Organization (March 18, 2026). The official CISA advisory issued in the wake of the Stryker incident, including specific guidance on Multi Admin Approval for high-impact actions like device wiping. cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/03/18/cisa-urges-endpoint-management-system-hardening-after-cyberattack-against-us-organization CISA Binding Operational Directive 26-02 — Mitigating Risk From End-of-Support Edge Devices (February 5, 2026). The federal directive that defines deadlines for inventorying and decommissioning unsupported edge infrastructure — a useful baseline for anyone managing lifecycle debt. cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-02-mitigating-risk-end-support-edge-devices 3. Andrew Witty Written Testimony, House Energy & Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight (April 30, 2024). UnitedHealth Group CEO's congressional testimony confirming the Change Healthcare breach occurred via a Citrix portal that did not have multi-factor authentication enabled. <a href='http://energycommerce.house.gov/events/oversight-and-investigations-subcommittee-hearing-examining-the-
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Stay ahead of the latest cybersecurity trends with Cyberside Chats! Listen to our weekly podcast and join us live once a month for breaking news, emerging threats, and actionable solutions. Whether you’re a cybersecurity pro or an executive who wants to understand how to protect your organization, cybersecurity experts Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin will help you understand and proactively prepare for today’s top cybersecurity threats, AI-driven attack and defense strategies, and more!
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